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Siimmary;
This paper is a case study of the dispute that arose between McDonnell
Douglas Corporation and the United States Government concerning the
appropriate interpretation of Cost Accounting Standard 403 with regard
to the allocation of state and local income and franchise taxes.
Particular emphasis is given to the Shapley value as a method of allo-
cation.
:• >'j\-:>.
.,?:'- if - -Ji *'•
:
••?; I
«1
": *
:
Introduction
Along with a variety of unique mathematical characteristics, the
Shapley value has as to date a less distinguished property: it has been
widely advocated as a method of cost allocation, but it has been rarely
used. The Shapley value was introduced by Shapley [1953] as a method
for each player to assess a_ priori the benefits he would expect from
playing a game. However, Shubik 11962] is generally credited with intro-
ducing the Shapley value as amethod of cost allocation. Shubik' a sug-
gestion eventually spawned a considerable body of literature. Recent
articles dealing with the Shapley value as a method of cost allocation
include Loehman and Whinston £1971, 1974], Champsaur [1975], Littlechlld
and Thompson [1977], Hamlen, Hamlen, and Tschirhart [1977], Jensen [1977],
Callen [1978], and Roth and Verrecchia [1979]. Taken as a whole, this
literature has attempted to point out the variety of circumstances in
which the Shapley value yields an appropriate allocation of cost.
Sufficient enthusiasm has been generated that even a severe critic of
cost allocation, Thomas [1978, p.Y-8], has grudingly remarked that
"Ip]erhaps Shapley allocations are an idea whose accounting time has
come."
Despite this, evidence concerning the implementation of the Shapley
value to resolve practical cost allocation problems is largely anecdotal.
It has been proposed to allocate the cost of aircraft landing fees
(Littlechlld and Thompson [1977]), public goods and services (Loehman
and Whinston [1974]), and depreciation (Callen [1978]). But the only
well-documented implementation has been to allocate the costs among
users of a telephone system at Cornell University (Billera, Heath, and
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Raanan [1978]). Therefore, the appplication of the Shapley value to a
practical accounting issue is of considerable interest.
An opportunity to use the Shapley value arose in a dispute between
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) , the largest defense contractor in
the United States, and the United States Government, concerning the
proper Interpretation of Cost Accounting Standard 403 (CAS 403) with
regard to the allocation of corporate state and local income and franchise
taxes (SLIFT) to segments of a company. Essentially, the dispute reduced
to the following: which "factors" are proper for allocating SLIFT within
a firm, and, assuming that these factors can be agreed-upon, what type
of allocation scheme will give each its appropriate weight. Although
this leaves the question open to consideration of a wide range of methods,
the dispute, which arose from an ongoing Government-contractor contro-
versy, centered around three allocation schones, each representing a
possible viewpoint: The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) method
proposed by the Government, the gross payroll method used by MDC, and
the (taxable) income/loss method.
SLIFT, however, can involve a complex interaction among the various
elements of a firm, and all three methods fail to capture some aspect
of this. The fact that the Shapley value is well-suited to assess this
interaction led MDC to employ it as a "benchmark" against which the
results achieved by the three simpler, and more traditional, allocation
methods mentioned above could be tested for compliance with CAS 403.
The justification for using the Shapley value is that it is predicated
on axioms and assumptions which, on an a^ priori basis, impartial ob-
servers view as desirable and equitable.
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The primary purpose of this paper is to discuss problems that arise
in interpreting CAS 403 with regard to the allocation of SLIFT, as well
as the strengths and weaknesses of the various allocation schemes. An
auxiliary purpose is to point out the usefulness of the Shapley value
as a way to resolve disputes involving a choice among alternative methods.
Background Information
MDC is a multi-state, multi-segment company engaged principally in
the design, development, testing, and production of aerospace and elec-
tronic products for Government and commercial customers. There was con-
sensus that MDC had four material and relevant segments, as the term
"segment" of a company is defined by CAS 403. Of these, two are
principally located in Missouri: the McDonnell Aircraft Company (MCAIR),
and the McDonnell Astronautics Company - St. Louis (MDAC-SL) . The other
two are principally located in California: Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC),
and the McDonnell Astronautics Company - Huntington Beach (MDAC-HB) . The
operations of these segments of MDC are primarily carried on in the states
in which they are located, but each is a multi-state segment having oper-
ations in both Missouri and California. Because these are the only seg-
ments considered material and relevant, the tables and supporting dis-
cussion will treat the remaining segments of MDC as a single "residual"
segment
.
In general terms, under contracts entered into between the United
States and MDC, the Government is required to reimburse MDC for the
cost of SLIFT to the extent that its contracts cause the incurrence
of these costs. Contracts contain as one of their terms a clause
requiring MDC to comply with all Cost Accounting Standards in effect
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on the date of the award of the contract, as well as to comply with
any Cost Accounting Standard which becomes applicable to the contract
after the award.
Because the Government did not believe that the reimbursable costs
of SLIFT Claimed by MBC were in compliance with CAS 403, a "token" dis-
allowance of the SLIFT claimed by MDC for a single contract (in the amount
of $88.78) was arranged between MDC and the Government to serve as a test
case. In a disallowance dated September 6, 1974, the Government's
resident Auditor gave notice of noncoii^>liance under the following method:
MDC treated the expense of state and local income and franchise
taxes as a corporate general and administrative expense and
distributed the expense to MDC's segments (divisional companies
and subsidiaries) on the basis of gross payroll.
That is, MDC's method provided for the payment of all SLIFT by its cor-
porate home office and the accumulation of the expense of SLIFT as a cor-
porate home office cost^ on the grounds that SLIFT are a corporate obli-
gation of MDC as distinguished from a separate obligation of any particular
segment. It then provided for the corporate home office to allocate the
accumulated amount to its segments in the ratio that each segment's gross
payroll dollars bore to the gross payroll dollars for all segments. Ap-.
proximately 97% of the total SLIFT paid by MDC for calendar years 1974
through 1976 were for the California Franchise Tax (CFT) and the Missouri
,. .
Income Tax (MIT). Therefore, although MDC pays numerous other SLIFT, the
only two taxes considered to be material and relevant to the dispute were
the CFT and the MIT.
California Franchise Tax
For purposes of this discussion, we will focus exclusively on the
CFT. Subject to exceptions not material or relevant to the dispute.
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the cost of the CFT is computed as follows. MDC's net corporate-wide
business income (called unitary income in California, but commonly
called "corporate-wide income") , as defined by the taxing jurisdiction
of California, is multiplied by an "apportionment ratio"; the product
purports to measure income attributable to that jurisdiction for pur-
poses of taxation, and is commonly referred to as "taxable income".
The apportionment ratio is the summation of three fractions, divided
by three:
Apportionment
_ i r California CCA) Property CA Payroll _^ CA Sales y
Ratio ~ 3 Worldwide Property Worldwide Payroll Worldwide Sales
In the case of each fraction, the numerator is the dollar amount of the item
found or occurring in the taxing jurisdiction (i.e., California), and the
denominator is the dollar amount of the item found or occurring in all rel-
evant jurisdictions (i.e., worldwide). The total tax payment is the product
of corporate-wide income, the apportionment ratio, and the rate, which is
9% in California: specifically.
Total CFT
_
Corporate-wide Apportionment _„
Payment Income Ratio
If the total CFT payment computes to an amount less than two hundred
dollars, a two hundred dollar minimum tax payment per corporation is
required by California. However, for the purpose of the subsequent
discussion, this mimimum tax payment will be ignored in those years
in which MDC experiences a corporate-wide loss.
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Cost Accounting Standard 403
There was consensus that payments of the CFT and the MIT by MDC's
home office are central payments or accruals. As promulgated by the
Cost Accounting Standards Board, Cost Accounting Standard 403 (CAS 403)
contains the following provision in Section 403.40(b)(4):
(4) Central payments or accruals . Central payments or
accruals which are made by a home office on behalf of its
segments shall be allocated directly to segments to the ex-
tent that all such payments or accruals of a given type or
class can be identified specifically with individual segments.
Central payments or accruals are those which but for the exis-
tence of a number of segments would be accrued or paid by the
individual segments. Common examples include centrally paid
or accrued pension costs,' group insurance costs. State and
local income taxes and franchise taxes, and payrolls paid by
a home office; on behalf of its segments. Any such types of
payments or accruals which cannot be identified specifically
with individual segments shall be allocated to benefited seg-
ments using an allocation base representative of the factors
on which the total payment is based [Emphasis added]
.
It has been argued that the CFT, unlike a property tax or a sales tax,
cannot be specifically identified to individual segments because the CFT
is the product of a complex interaction among all segments. In support
of this position is the fact that separate segments' tax computation
rarely if ever produce tax amounts additive to the corporate tax paid.
Therefore, its allocation requires determining an allocation base repre-
sentative of the factors on vzhich the total payment is based.
Stripped of all its legal complexities, the dispute between MDC and
the Government reduces to the appropriate interpretation of a single
word, "factors". Although it Is not defined in the definitions section
of the Standard, the term "factors" is used in several provisions of
CAS 403, Including provisions not related to the allocation of SLIFT»
In particular, it is used at two crucial junctures. In addition to the
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last sentence of CAS 403.40(b)(4) cited above, the illustrative alloca-
tion base for SLIFT in appropriate circumstances under CAS 403.60(c) uses
the term "factors" as follows:
3. State and local income 3. Any base or method which
taxes and franchise taxes. results in an allocation
that equals or approximates
a segment's proportionate
share of the tax imposed by
the jurisdiction in which
the segment does business,
as measured by the same
factors used to determine
taxable income for that
jurisdiction [Emphasis added].
The parties disagreed as to whether the "factors on which the total
payment is based," and the "factors used to determine taxable income" were
those factors specifically identified and prescribed by the statute for
apportioning the income, sometimes called the "statutory" factors, or
whether they were all of the factors used to compute the total tax payment
and taxable income. The statute imposing the CFT specifically prescribed
its "factors" to be property, payroll, and sales in the apportionment
ratio. (Other taxing jurisdictions do not necessarily identify the ele-
pentB of the apportioiment ratio as factors.) Since, as will be clear
from examining the data, the inclusion of income as a factor has a mater-
ial effect on how cost is allocated, this issue can be further reduced to
whether income is a "representative factor", and if it is, what weight it
should be given in an allocation scheme. (J^ote that although the tax
rate is also a factor in the computation of CFT paid by MDC, it is common
to all segments in a taxing jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction allocation process,
and, thus, requires no explicit attention.)
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The Defense Contract Audit Agency Method
In determining the appropriate interpretation of the word "factors",
one should consider the ramifications of various interpretations. Using
the statutory factors as an allocation base implies that taxes associated
with the state of California are allocated to segments only to the
extent to which they have property, payroll, and sales in California.
The Government proposed the DCAA method as an allocation scheme
compatible with this logic. The DCAA method can be explained as follows:
let the DCAA apportionment ratio (DCAA-AR) for some segment of a firm
be defined as Segment's
California (CA) Segment's Segment's
r,.,.. .T,/o ^N Ir Property . CA Payroll . CA Sales ,DCAA-AR(Segment) = j { ^otal CA ^ Total CA ^ Total CA ^ *
Property Pajrroll Sales
Then the cost of the CFI is allocated to a segment using the following
expression:
Cost of CFT Allocated
^ ^^^_^ (Segment) x Total CFT . .
to Segment
Anderson [1977] refers to this as a EO-called "factors method".
He argues [1977, p. 38-9]
:
Since state franchise and income taxes are incurred because
a corporate segmeht is physically located in, or does business
within, a state, the only correct approach to cost allocation
is first to accumulate tax expenses by state. Once accumula-
ted into cost pools by state or taxing jurisdiction, the state
income tax costs should be assigned to corporate segments
based on the [statutory] factors used to compute taxable
income of the segments within the state. .
Summarizing his position, Anderson equates the existence of the taxing
jurisdiction with the cause of the tax. For example, in another passage,
he says [1977, p. 38]:
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State franchise and income taxes are caused by an entity being
housed in or conducting business within a specific state ...
[the factors method] requires that taxes associated with a
specific state or taxing jurisdiction be allocated only to
segments operating or doing business within that territory.
On the basis of data supplied by MDC in Tables 1 and 2, it can be
observed that the DCAA. method effects an allocation that is favorable
to the Government, as compared against other methods to be discussed.
Insert Tables 1 & 2
About Here
This is explained by the fact that one of MDC's four principal segments,
DAC, does primarily commercial work and is located primarily in California.
Thus, using the DCAA. method, most of the cost of the CFT is allocated to
DAC, which, as an intermediate cost objective, in turn allocates the cost
to contracts performed there. However, since these are primarily commercial
contracts, and since the Government only makes payment for costs arising
from Government contracts, claims by MDC against the Government for costs
related to the CFT are minimized (relative to methods yet to be discussed)
.
The problem is that the DCAA method achieves this result by giving no
weight to income as a factor in what is, without dispute, an income-based
'tax.
Income/Loss
In contrast to the DCAA method, income/loss is an allocation base that
has traditionally been used to allocate income-based taxes. The income/
loss method can be expressed as follows:
Cost of CFT Allocated
_
. Segment's Income/Loss ,
r t ^ cvr
to Segment Worldwide Income '
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where income/loss is as defined by the taxing jurisdiction, i.e., Cali-
fornia. In the case in which a segment experiences a loss, the incojne/loss
method allocates a credit to that segisent. (This assumes, of course,
that worldwide income is nonnegative, since otherwise there is no cost
to allocate.)
Whereas the "factors" approach exemplified by the DCAA method ignores
income as a factor, the income/ loss method fails to give weight to the
fact that the tax is caused, in part, by having property, payroll, and
sales in California and elsewhere, as measured, say, by the apportionment
ratio. For this reason, the income/loss method and the DCAA method are
antithetical. For the data supplied by MDC, they also achieve substan-
tially different results.
One explanation for the fact that income/loss has traditionally been
used is that for a "mature" firm, i.e., one with relatively stable property,
payroll, and sales, the magnitude of the tax in any year will be determined
by corporate-wide income for that year. As CAS 403 was initially published
(in proposed form in the Federal Register ) , the following illustrative
allocation basis for the allocation of SLIFX based on income was provided
in Section 403*60:
3. State and local income 3. Allocate to segments on
taxes and franchise tcixes the basis of the income or
based on income. loss of such segments.
The shift from "income/loss" to "factors" (see above) in the final
promulgation of CAS 403 evokes the idea that all factors affecting the
quantum of the expense are to be taken into consideration.
In any event, the income/loss allocation basis effects an allocation
that is very favorable to MDC during the years 1968-1976. Examination of
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Tables 3 and 4 shows this is because its principal conmercial segment,
DAC,
Insert Tables 3 & 4
About Here
experienced either relatively less income or a loss in some of these
years. Thus, the cost of the SLIFT is chiefly borne by the more profit-
able segments of KDC, which also happen to be those that do primarily
Government work.
Gross Payroll
As CAS 403 states in the preamble, the allocation of home office
expenses to segments (such as SLIFT) is a question of equity:
Work on this standard was initiated as the result of a variety
of continuing problems between contractors and the government
concerning equitable allocations of home office expenses to
segments involved in negotiated defense contracts.
The DCAA method effects a cost allocation that is favorable to the
Government, and income/loss effects one that is favorable to MDC. It
would appear that the DCAA method weights that part of the cost that is
attributable to having property, payroll, and sales within the state of
California, whereas the income/loss method weights that part of the cost
attributable to Income. Thus, some allocation base which strikes a com-
promise between these two extreme positions by giving each equal weight
would indeed allocate on a basis representative of all the factors, in-
cliiding income.
Gross payroll achieves this balance by a coincidence in the data,
rather than by design. The gross payroll method of allocation can be
represented as follows:
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Cost of CFT Allocated ^ , Segment's Payroll , , ™,
to Segment Worldwide Payroll
On the basis of the specific data relating to MDC, gross payroll appears
to give representative weight to all the factors. See, for example,
Tables 5 and 6.
Insert Tables 5 & 6
About Here
The fimdamental problem with gross payroll, the DCAA method, and
income/loss, is that none of these methods comply in the abstract with
CAS 403.40 Cb) (A) since each ignores one, or more, of the factors
material and relevant for computing the total tax expense. It has been
argued that gross payroll is permissible because it is representative
of the factors. Section 403.60Cc) provides a basis for the argument:
(c) The listed allocation bases in this section are illustra-
tive. Other bases for allocation of home office expenses to
segments may be used if they are substantially in accordance
with the beneficial or causal relationships outlined in Section
403.AO [Emphasis added]
.
That is, it has been argued that gross payroll may be in accordance with
the two causal relationships assessed individually by the DCAA method
and the income/loss method because, on the basis of the specific data,
gross payroll gives representative weight to the two. Clearly, though,
this compliance cannot be determined without reference to the data.
. .
The Shapley Value
In order to determine the causal relationship, MDC examined the
Shapley value as a method for allocating SLIFT. The Shapley value
is computed as follows. Suppose that the full cost of the CFT is
to be shared among n segments of a firm, which will be designated by
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S •= {1,2,. ..,n}. The function v(S) describes the CFT assessed to the
loalition S when those segments that comprise S cooperate as if^ they were
a separate firm with no ties to segments not included in the coalition.
Chat is,
(o\ - L s S's CA Property S's CA Payroll S's CA Sales .v(,b; = 2 t s's Worldwide Property S's Worldwide Payroll S's Worldwide Sales
X { S's Corporate Wide Income } x 9% ,
assuming that this computes to a nonnegative value; otherwise vCS)
iquals zero. Note that this is the way the state of California would
issess the CFT on coalition S if it were a business entity separate from
segments not in S (ignoring the two hundred dollar minimum tax payment)
.
rhe Shapley value can be expressed mathematically as follows:
Cost of CFT Allocated ^ ^ (s-1) ! (n-s)
1
r^/g)
_ v(S-{i})}
to Segment i _^„ n! \ J >
rhere s is the number of segments in coalition S, and n is the total
lumber of segments. (Jensen [1977] provides a detailed explanation of
:be Shapley value as a method of cost allocation.) Tables 7 and 8 illus-
:rate how the costs of the CFT are allocated within MDC using the Shapley
'alue.
Insert Tables 7 & 8
About Here
The advantage of the Shapley value is that it Implies a notion
>f equity. Terms such as fairness, neutrality, and equity are vague
md nonoperative. Therefore, to the extent to which the Shapley value
[oes operationalize these accounting objectives, its use as a benchmark
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agalnst which more traditional allocation bases can be compared is
important. For example, Loehman and Whinston [1978, p. 238] remark:
These axioms [those that imply the Shapley value] serve to
define a notion of equity in providing a public service and
may be viewed as a constitution to which users of a public
service agree prior to undertaking a collective agreement.
Jet.sen [1978] suggests that the Shapley value implies a "class of
mutually satisfactory allocations." Roth and Verrecchia [1979] establish
thfi.t under certain assumption^ (related to risk neutrality)
:
The Shapley value represents managers* expected utility for
bargaining, and therefore each manager would be Indifferent
between having his department charged its gross benefit less
its Shapley value, or bargaining to an uncertain outcome.
In this sense the Shapley value represents a fair, equitable, .
neutral, and costless surrogate for allowing managers to
bargain bver how costs will be allocated.
In brief, a theoretieally defensible notion of equity underlies the
Shapley value.
In comparing the DCAA. method with the Shapley value, there is an
obvious difference: the Shapley value gives effect to each segment's
income as .it contributes to corporate-wide income. Furthermore, and
peirhaps more subtly, it gives effect to the denominators of the appor-
tionment ratio which increase or reduce corporate-wide income taxed in
California. For example, if MDAC-St. Louis increases its payroll, then
MDd's total CFT payment will be reduced because the apportionment ratio
will be lowered (all other things held constant) by this increase in
payroll outside the state of California. The Shapley value gives effect
to this by similarly reducing the CFT assessed to any coalition In which
MDiVC-St. Louis is a member. Of course, in comparing the income/loss
method with the Shapley value, the income/loss method ignores the appor-
tionment ratio altogether.
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The Interesting feature of gross payroll is how closely it approxi-
mates the Sbapley value with respect to Government contracts, for the
specific data available. Over the three year period governed by CAS
403, 1974-1976, gross payroll results in an overall effect on Government
contracts of $10,050,000, whereas the Shapley value results in an over-
all effect of $10,264,000: reference Tables 6 and 8. The cumulative
effect of the CFT on Government contracts to each segment over the three
year period using gross payroll versus the Shapley value is also very
close: $1,015,000 versus $1,194,000 for DAG, and $5,196,000 versus
$5,314,000 for MCAIR. The greatest discrepancy among segments occurs
for MDAC-HB, but even here it is a difference of less than $1,300,000
($1,682,000 versus $2,958,000) which is approximately twelve percent
of the overall effect on Government contracts of between ten and ten-
and-a-quarter million dollars. While this fails to redeem gross payroll
from the obvious criticism that it is an allocation on the basis of
a single factor, it does suggest that payroll may be a reliable surrogate
for the Shapley value over the three year period. Furthermore, gross
payroll has some advantage in that the layperson may find it simpler to
apply and easier to understand.
An Analysis of the Shapley Value
Because the CFT is a relatively simple cost to analyze, some in-
tuition can be provided for how the Shapley value allocates it. Consider
a hypothetical situation in which a corporation has three segments, each
of which has property valued at one million dollars, payroll of one-half
million -dollars, and sales of one and one-half million dollars. The
first, however, has all its property, payroll, and sales located within
-16-
the state of California, while the second has all its property, payroll,
and sales located in Missouri, and the third has exactly one-half of all
its property, payroll, and sales located in Califoimia, and the other
half located in Missouri. We will refer to the first as segment CA, for
California, the second as segment MO, for Missouri, and the third as
segment CA-MO, for California-Missouri,
Suppose that each segment contributes income of $600,000 to the
corporation. It can be demonstrated (see Table 9) that whenever the
income of all three segments are equal, two-thirds of the CFT will be
allocated to the CA segment and one-third will be allocated to the CA-MO
segment when the Shapley value is employed. That is, if all three seg-
ments contribute income to the corporation in the same proportion as
they contribute property, payroll, and sales to the corporation, all of
the CFT is allocated to segments in the same proportion to which they
have property, payroll, and sales in the taxing jurisdiction that imposes
the tax on the corporation. This result can be generalized to the fol-
lowing. Suppose that each segment of a corporation has an identical
amount of property, payroll, and sales. When the income of each
segment is also identical, the Shapley value allocates the cost of the
CFT in precisely the same manner as the DCAA method: that is, it achieves
the same type of allocation Anderson advocates in his discussion of the
"factors method."
It is because of the fact that the income relative to the property,
payroll, and sales of the five segments of MDC are not identical
that the Sihapley value does not effect an allocation similar to the fac-
tors method. Considering our previous hypothetical example, suppose
-
-• li
'Ai'
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that the MO segment contributes income of $1,200,000 to the corporation
and everything else remains the same. In this case the MO segment con-
tributes income to the corporation out of proportion to its property,
payroll, and sales, relative to the income contributed by the CA and
CA-MO segments in proportion to their property, payroll, and sales.
Consequently, the Shapley value shifts part of the cost of the tax to
the MO segment (see Table 10) . This can be explained intuitively by
the fact that by contributing income in excess of its relative propor-
tion of property, payroll, and sales within the corporation, the MO
segment is causing part of the CFT since it is an income-based tax;
therefore it should be allocated part of the cost.
Although this hypothetical example is a fair representation of the
situation MDC encounters in the years 1968 through 1976, it should be
pointed out that if both the CA and CA-MO segments, say, contribute in-
come of $1,200,000 and everything else remains as in the original case
(e.g., the MO segment contributes income of $600,000), the Shapley value
not only would allocate a credit to the MO segment, but also would require
that the CA and CA-MO segments absorb both the full cost of the CFT and
the credit allocated the MO segment. This follows logically from the
sane argument employed above,
Non-Subaddltive Cost Functions
Another interesting feature of the CFT is that most treatments of
the Shapley value have explored situations in which economies of scale
are created when additional segments cooperate to share some cost. That
is, the -average cost per segment decreases. A cost function which has
this property is referred to as a "subadditive cost function." The CFT
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is not a subadditive cost function in all circumstances. For example,
addition of a segment can increase a coalition's tax payment by increasing
either the coalition's apportionment ratio, or its income, in a fashion
that increases its average tax payment per segment.
Of course, the absence of a subadditive cost function, in and of
itself, does not rule out the Shapley value as a method of cost assign-
ment. As Jensen [1978, p. 8451 remarks
s
... the five axioms {that imply the Shapley value] are suffi-
cient conditions for the allocation function without an eco-
nomies of scale requirement.
Furthermore, it may make no difference to the firm that the cost is not
subadditive. Roth and Verrecchia [1979] remark:
. . . there may be circumstances in which a firm would find
it convenient to assume that managers behaved as if their
preferences obeyed these assumptions [those that implied
the Shapley value], and in these circumstances the justifi-
cation for using the Shapley value as a cost assignment
method would be clear.
But whether non-subadditivity is an issue should be considered. At
least two arguments suggest that it is not.
First, it is myopic to focus on a single cost. A firm encounters
a number of costs and it is very probable that in aggregate economies
of scale are created by segments sharing these costs. When the average
cost per segment decreases over all costs as additional segments cooperate
to share these costs, total costs are subadditive. Furthermore, no matter
how these costs are first disaggregated end then allocated, the Shapley
value yields the same resxilt. This mathematical property of the Shapley
value is referred to as the "linearity condition" by Billera, et al.
119783:
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The linearity condition ... can be interpreted to mean that
no matter how the costs in question are broken down into
various components (line rental, maintenance, taxes, employee
salaries, etc.), if each component is allocated "fairly"
[i.e., via the Shapley value] over the collection of service
types, then the total charge would be the same as if these
costs were first aggregated and then allocated as a whole.
Thus, it is legitimate to examine how the Shapley value allocates a
single (potentially) non-subadditive cost, such as the CFT, since it
makes no difference how costs are disaggregated, and subadditivity over
all costs eliminates the non-subadditivlty of this cost as an issue.
Furthermore, most applications of the Shapley value involve a way
for two or more independent parties to share a gain or a saving. The
MDC case, however, involves the internal allocation of a single firm.
Even with economies of scale, a segment might not choose to join a coali-
tion for the purpose of sharing the costs of services from which it does
not benefit (such as elements of the coalition other than itself doing
business in a particular taxing jurisdiction). But, assuming that a
firm exists and a cost arises that needs to be shared, this element of
choice is eliminated; the cost must be allocated among segments on the
basis of a beneficial or causal relationship even though it might be to
the advantage of some segments not to assume this cost in the first place.
In effect, the existence of a single interest (e.g., the firm) invalidates
the requirement that economies of scale exist for all segments over the
cost. Thus, non-subadditivity should be of no concern.
Limitations of the Shapley Value
Three practical limitations to the use of the Shapley value for
allocation purposes are often mentioned:
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1) the computational burden associated with computing Shapley
values
,
2) the unavailability of carefully audited accounting data to
be used in the computations,
3) the inability to objectively measure the cost associated
with each possible coalition of segments within a firm.
(Note that determining what constitutes a segment is not an issue
since a segment is defined in CAS 403). Any of these three problems
is sufficient to preclude use of the Shapley value to resolve prac-
tical accounting issues. As it happens, however, none of these prob- .
lems plays a major role in this particular case.
Provided that the nximber of segments involved is not unreasonably
large, efficient algorithms for computing the Shapley value exist.
Itirthermore, if the Shapley value is designed as a test of equitabi-
lity, it may only be necessary to consider material segments, as is
the case in the dispute between MDC and the Government. (In fact, for
the case of five segments the computation is trivial for a computer.)
This can reduce the number of computations to a very manageable size.
The unavailability of carefully audited accounting data is also
a serious practical limitation, but not in the case of defense con-
tractors. In the case of MDC, each segment's income (as defined by the
California taxing jurisdiction), as vrell as its property, payroll, and
sales, is accumulated for the CFT. If this were not the case, use of
the Shapley value might require the preparation, and auditing, of this
additional information. However, this is a problem, to a greater or
lesser extent, in the choice of any allocation base.
The inability to measure objectively the cost associated with
coalitions creates an additional problem. For example, if the Shapley
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value were used to allocate the cost of the salaries of the president
and the officers of MDC, those salaries would have to be determined
for each hypothetical circumstance in which coalitions cooperate as if
they were a firm separate from segments not in their coalition. This
might prove difficult, and, at the least, it vjould introduce a disturb-
ing element of subjectivity. Taxes, however, are ideally suited to the
Sliapley value since each coalition's tax pa3niient can be computed precisely
as the taxing jurisdiction would compute the tax on that coalition. This
removes any subjectivity.
In brief, practical limitations prohibiting the widespread use of
the Shapley value to allocate cost have often been alluded to but have
rarely been analyzed in the context of a practical accounting problem.
Thus, they may have been overstated. Certainly in MDC's allocation of
SLIFT, these practical limitations do not materialize; SLIFT serve as
an excellent opportunity to use the Shapley value.
Summary
CAS A03 is written in broad language to encompass the allocation of
a multiplicity of types of SLIFT, other payments and accruals, and other
costs. Therefore, it is perhaps unavoidable that disputes will arise.
But if the advantage of language is its flexibility, the advantage of
the Shapley value is that it determines an equitable allocation of a
shared cost on the basis of the beneficial or causal relationships, and
thus is well-suited to resolving interpretations. In the absence of
a definitive treatment of practical limitations, it may be unreasonable
to expect adoption of the Shapley value to allocate all costs. But
-22-
where equity is the crux of the dispute, the Shapley value can provide
at least a useful benchmark against which more traditional allocation
methods can be computed.
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FOOTNOTES
1. In Section A 03. 30, a segment is defined:
Segment . One of two or more divisions, product depart-
ments, plants, or other subdivisions of an organization
reporting directly to a home office, usually identified
with responsibility for profit and/or producing a product
or service.
2. An analysis of the MIT which parallels that of the CFT is available
from the author. The analysis is not included here because it is
essentially the same as the one involving the CFT.
3. This approach to determine taxable income is often referred to as
the Massachusetts formula approach.
4. 37 F.R. 13063-130fa5 (June 30, 1972).
5. A proof of this result is available from the author upon request.
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